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Abstract— Recent advances of deep learning have brought
exceptional performance on many computer vision tasks such
as semantic segmentation and depth estimation. However, the
vulnerability of deep neural networks towards adversarial ex-
amples have caused grave concerns for real-world deployment.
In this paper, we present a systematic study of adversarial
attacks on monocular depth estimation, an important task
of 3D scene understanding in scenarios such as autonomous
driving and robot navigation. In order to understand the impact
of adversarial attacks on depth estimation, we first define a
taxonomy of different attack scenarios for depth estimation,
including non-targeted attacks, targeted attacks and universal
attacks. We then adapt several state-of-the-art attack methods
for classification on the field of depth estimation. Besides,
multi-task attacks are introduced to further improve the attack
performance for universal attacks. Experimental results show
that it is possible to generate significant errors on depth
estimation. In particular, we demonstrate that our methods
can conduct targeted attacks on given objects (such as a car),
resulting in depth estimation 3-4× away from the ground truth
(e.g., from 20m to 80m).
I. INTRODUCTION
Monocular depth prediction, i.e. predicting the per-pixel
distances to the camera, is a key task for 3D scene under-
standing. Learning 3D scene geometries has many applica-
tions such as robot assisted surgery, robot navigation and
autonomous driving [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]. With its wide-
spread applications, more and more works have significantly
promoted the monocular depth estimation performance using
DCNN-based models [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12].
Meanwhile, the advances in deep learning have largely
pushed forward the state-of-the-art in various tasks in com-
puter vision, such as image classification and semantic seg-
mentation. However, several studies [13], [14] have demon-
strated the vulnerability of deep learning based methods to
deliberately generated adversarial examples, bringing reli-
ability concerns to the applications in many safety-critical
domains, such as autonomous driving and video surveillance.
Hence, more and more work [15], [16] about adversarial
attacks have been proposed to evaluate the robustness and
reliability of neural network models before they are deployed
in the real world.
Recent studies on adversarial attacks have served as the
foundation of adversarial training, i.e. a common technique to
enhance model robustness [17], [18], [19], [20]. Specifically,
adversarial examples generated from the attack methods are
combined into training data. Models trained with the mixture
of clean data and adversarial data thus become more robust
to adversarial attacks. Similar to attacks on classification, a
systematic study of attack on depth estimation could also
(a) Original mean object depth is 8.2m
(b) Adversarial mean object depth is 3.7m (0.5×)
(c) Adversarial mean object depth is 35.5m (4.3×)
(d) Adversarial mean object depth is 68.6m (8.4×)
Fig. 1: An illustration of the targeted attack on monocular
depth estimation. The goal of this attack is to mislead the
depth of specific objects (the black car in the red box in this
case). The left column contains RGB images and the right
column includes the corresponding depth prediction results.
The first row shows the original images while three different
adversarial examples are shown in the following rows. In
the depth prediction image, bright yellow represents large
depth value while dark blue represents small value. The depth
estimation results are distorted up to 8× from the original
prediction. Best viewed in color.
strengthen the robustness of depth models.
Although a number of attack methods [14], [21], [22],
[23], [24], [13], [16] have been proposed, they mainly focus
on classification [22], [14], [21] or segmentation [24], [25],
[26]. Both tasks aim to pick a label among a fixed number of
categories, so these techniques are not designed specifically
to attack tasks such as monocular depth estimation, which
aims to regress a precise value for each pixel.
In order to investigate the problem of adversarial attacks
on monocular depth estimation, we first define a taxonomy
of different attack scenarios for depth estimation, including
non-targeted attacks (for a specific image), targeted attacks
(for a specific object in an image) and universal attacks (for
an arbitrary image). We then adapted several state-of-the-art
attack methods to perform these attacks.
Moreover, we introduce a new multi-task attack strategy
to improve the performance in the universal attack scenario.
Multi-task strategies have been widely applied [27], [28],
[29], [30] in supervised learning, where various supervi-
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sion signals provide a more thorough understanding. In our
setting, the segmentation task and depth estimation form
the multi-task attack strategy (i.e. attacking both tasks
simultaneously), where the high-level task (semantic seg-
mentation) and low-level task (depth estimation) could offer
complementary information to further boost the attacking
performance for universal attacks.
We have performed extensive experiments on the popular
KITTI dataset [31]. Results demonstrate that the average
depth estimation errors (i.e. RMSE) can be distorted up to
10× compared with the original prediction, which means that
the adversarial attacks are real and practical. For targeted
attacks, the distance estimation results can be distorted
up to 3-4× (e.g., from 20m to 80m) for given objects.
Fig. 1 displays an example. In addition, our proposed multi-
task method achieves a better performance in the universal
attacks, compared to single-task setting.
The main contributions of this work are as follows.
• This paper presents a systematic study of adversarial
attacks on the task of monocular depth estimation. We
define and benchmark various experimental settings for
depth attacks, including non-targeted attacks, targeted
attacks and universal attacks.
• We have adapted several state-of-the-art adversarial
attack methods for classification to perform attacks
on depth estimation. A new attack strategy, multi-task
attack, is introduced to enforce attacking performance
on single task with the support of auxiliary task by
enriching supervision signals.
• Experimental results demonstrate that adversarial at-
tacks on depth estimation is a real threat as we are able
to generate significant errors in the estimation results.
In particular, we are able to attack specific objects such
as pedestrians and cars, bringing out much larger results
than the clean estimation. In addition, our proposed
multi-task attack strategy achieves better performance
than existing methods.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Monocular Depth Estimation
Monocular depth estimation plays an important role for
understanding spatial structures from 2D images. Traditional
methods use triangulation to compute spatial position of each
point corresponding in stereo images. Saxena et al [32]
proposed a supervised learning approach leveraging local-
and global-features. After that, various of methods based on
hand-crafted features have been proposed [33], [34], [35],
[36].
DCNN based techniques. Eigen et al first predicted dense
depth estimation with deep neural networks [37]. Supervised
deep learning-based approaches thus advanced the state of
the art with different techniques. Xie et al utilized the skip-
connection strategy to fuse low-resolution feature maps and
high-resolution feature maps [38]. Laina et al proposed a
fully convolutional architecture with residual learning and
an up-sampling module [9]. Fu et al proposed an ordinal
regression loss to recast depth network learning as a classifi-
cation problem [39]. In some work, CRF was integrated into
deep architectures as well [40], [12], [41] .
Multi-task strategy. Recent work further demonstrated
that depth estimation can be learned in a multi-task setting.
Xu et al proposed to simultaneously solve the problem of
depth estimation and scene parsing in a joint CNN [42].
Zhang et al proposed a task-recursive-learning framework
for semantic segmentation and depth estimation [43].
B. Adversarial Attacks
White-box and black-box attacks. White-box attack
means that attackers have the access of the target model.
Szegedy et al suggested that adding human imperceptible
perturbations leads deep neural networks to wrong predic-
tions [14]. Later, utilizing the linear property of neural
network, a fast attack method was developed and named
as Fast Gradient Sign Method [13]. Later, an iteration
based method [16] was built to generate stronger adversarial
examples. On the contrary, in black-box attack, attackers
cannot access the target model. People developed a variety
of methods to attack a black-box model, including query-
based [44], [45], decision-based [46], and transfer-based
methods [47], [22], [48], [49], [50], [51]. Several work stud-
ied the adversarial attacks on semantic segmentation [25],
[52], [24].
Per-image and universal attacks. Per-image attacks
mean to generate an adversarial example for each given
image specifically. Oppositely, universal attacks generates
a universal perturbation that can be directly added to any
test image to fool the classifier. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al sug-
gested the existence of universal adversarial perturbations
and generated them by iteratively optimizing the per-instance
adversarial loss [53]. Shafahi et al developed a much faster
universal adversarial attack method [54]. Mopuri et al gener-
ated data-independent universal perturbation by maximizing
spurious activations at each layer [55]. Metzen generated
universal adversarial perturbations against semantic segmen-
tation [24].
To the best of our knowledge, no existing work have
studied adversarial attacks on tasks such as monocular depth
estimation.
C. Monocular Depth Estimation and Adversarial Attacks
Some work relates to both monocular depth estimation
and adversarial attacks. Van et al [56] crafted some special
cases to study the internal mechanism of how networks see
depth from an image. The difference between this work and
[56] is that this paper studies human-undetectable adversarial
perturbation while Van et al constructs obvious fake images
that can be recognized from one sight. Mopuri et al [55]
proposed a data-free method to craft universal adversarial ex-
amples for a given CNN. Although their method is effective
on depth estimation and semantic segmentation respectively,
it aims at a single network and can not generate universal
examples that can attack both tasks from a different structure
at the same time. On the other hand, the technique described
in Section III-C generates universal examples that attack two
tasks from two different networks. Hu et al [57] studied the
white-box adversarial attacks (I-FGSM) on depth estimation
in an indoor situation and proposed to defense by saliency
map. By comparison, this paper studies a more dangerous
situation: the depth of a certain object can be manipulated
in autonomous driving. Besides, this paper utilizes multi-
task (depth estimation and semantic segmentation) to attack
better while Hu et al employs multi-task (depth estimation
and saliency map) to defense.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first formulate the problem of adver-
sarial attacks on depth estimation in Section III-A. Then
Section III-B presents three state-of-the-art methods we
adapted from classification. Finally, multi-task strategy is
illustrated in Section III-C .
A. Problem Formulation
Let x ∈ R3×h×w be an input image and ytrue ∈ Rh×w
be the ground truth depth image. f represents deep neural
network parameterized by θ and L(f(x; θ),ytrue) is the loss
function. We denote ξ as the adversarial perturbation and let
xadv = x + ξ be the corresponding adversarial example. To
make the adversarial example imperceptible, we restrict the
perturbation ‖ξ‖∞ < , where  is a given perturbation con-
straint. More specifically, this paper considers three different
types of depth attacks: non-targeted attacks, targeted attacks
and universal attacks.
Non-targeted attacks. Its goal is to maximize the predic-
tion error for a given image, such that the original model
would predict incorrectly (output incorrect depth values),
which is the most typical attack type. It maximizes a loss
function as described by Eq. 1:
max
xadv−x
L(f(xadv; θ),ytrue) s.t. ‖x− xadv‖∞ < . (1)
Targeted attacks. Taking into consideration the charac-
teristics of depth estimation, this attack aims to mislead
the model to produce incorrect depth estimation for specific
(masked) objects towards a predefined depth value, whose
objective is formulated in Eq. 2:
min
xadv−x
L(f(xadv; θ), C ·M + ytrue  (1−M))
s.t. ‖x− xadv‖∞ < , (2)
where M is a binary object mask and C is a predefined depth
value. The goal is to cause mis-estimation of certain objects
while preserving the other parts. For example, a targeted
attack could induce an autonomous driving car to predict
a rider ahead to be farther away.
Universal attacks. This third attack type aims to train a
universal adversarial perturbation (UAP) that can be added
to a broad class of images. The training goal is described
in Eq. 3, where N is the training image number. It empow-
ers attackers who cannot generate per-instance adversarial
examples on the go with an image-agnostic perturbation.
max
xadv−x
1
N
N∑
i=0
L(f(xadvi ; θ),y
true
i )
s.t. ‖xi − xadvi ‖∞ <  (3)
B. Adapting Existing Attacking Methods
In order to reveal the impact of adversarial attacks on
depth estimation, we first adapted three state-of-the-art attack
methods to attack depth estimation. These tasks include Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [13], Iterative FGSM (I-
FGSM) [16], and Momentum I-FGSM (MI-FGSM) [22].
With the loss functions defined earlier, we implement each
of the methods as follow.
FGSM. It computes the direction of the loss gradient,
and then adds the max possible perturbations on the original
image, by
xadv = x+  · sign (∇xL(f(x; θ),ytrue)) (4)
where sign(·) denotes the sign function.
I-FGSM. It initializes an adversarial example xadv0 = x
and then iteratively updates it by
xadvt+1 = Clip

x{xadvt +α · sign
(∇xL(f(xadvt ; θ),ytrue))}, (5)
The clip function Clipx ensures the generated adversarial
example is within the -ball of the original image x with
ground-truth ytrue.
MI-FSGM. This method integrates the momentum term
into the attack to stabilize update directions and escape from
poor local maxima. At the tth iteration, the accumulated
gradient is
gt+1 = µ · gt + ∇xL(f(x; θ),y
true)
||∇xL(f(x; θ),ytrue)||1 , (6)
where µ is the momentum decay factor. The sign of gn+1 is
then used to generate the adversarial example, by
xadvt+1 = Clip

x{xadvt + α · sign(gt+1)}. (7)
C. Multi-Task Strategy for Universal Attacks
Typically, universal attacks are not as effective as non-
targeted or targeted attacks in term of the increased error, as
they often attack a set of images simultaneously. To further
improve the performance of universal attacks, we introduce
the multi-task attack strategy. Specifically, In our setting,
both segmentation and depth estimation tasks are available.
The proposed strategy aims to generate the universal adver-
sarial perturbation to attack both tasks simultaneously. The
conjugation of low-level information provided by depth es-
timation and semantic information from segmentation could
offer more complementary signals than the single task, thus
boosting the performance of depth attacking.
Due to the lack of ground truth (no depth ground truth
and large-scale segmentation labels coexist simultaneously
in one dataset), we conduct the non-targeted attack to depth
estimation and use the least-likely method (LLM) [16] to
perform the segmentation task. LLM takes the least likely
label yLL = argminy p(y|x) as the attack target and
increases the prediction probability of that label as described
in Eq. 8.
min
xadv−x
L(f(xadv; θ),yLL) s.t. ‖x− xadv‖∞ <  (8)
We utilize MI-FGSM to illustrate the generation of univer-
sal adversarial perturbation with the multi-task strategy. Note
MI-FGSM can be replaced by any method in section III-
B easily. To compute the adversarial perturbation for a
minibatch, we use L = Ex∈BL(f(x, θ),y) as the target loss
function, where B represents a minibatch. In specific, we
define L
depth
t = Ex∈BtLdepth(f(x; θ),ytrue) and L
semantic
t =
Ex∈BtLsemantic(f(x, θ),yLL). To combine information from
both tasks, we compute the averaged loss Lt as Eq. 9 and
averaged gradient gtas Eq. 10, where wdepth and wsemantic are
predefined weights for each task.
Lt = wdepth · |Ldeptht |+ wsemantic · |L
semantic
t | (9)
gt = wdepth ·
∇xLdeptht
‖∇xLdeptht ‖1
+wsemantic · ∇xL
semantic
t
‖∇xLsemantict ‖1
(10)
Our multi-task universal attack algorithm is summarized in
Algorithm 1.
In our implementation, two tasks are involved in the multi-
task attack and note that it is easy to extend this strategy to
more tasks to take advantage of more supervision signals.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Experimental Setup
Dataset. We use the KITTI depth estimation dataset [31],
which consists of 85, 898 training images and 6, 852 vali-
dation images, created by aggregating LiDAR scans from
consecutive frames before projecting into one image. It con-
tains semi-dense depth ground truth of about 30% annotated
pixels. We center crop every image to the size of 321×929.
In the per-image attack, all images in the validation set are
used. In the universal attack, we randomly select 17, 913
images as the training set and test on the validation set. We
train universal adversarial perturbation for 2 epochs.
Evaluation metrics. We adopt root mean squared error
(RMSE) [58] and masked mean depth (MMD) to evaluate the
performance on non-targeted attack and targeted attack,
respectively. Specifically, given the ground truth depth Y ∗ =
{y∗} and predicted depth Y = {y}, RMSE is computed by√
1
|Y ∗|
∑
y∗∈Y ∗ ‖y∗ − y‖2. The larger RMSE is, the farther
predicted depth is from the ground truth depth, which means
a better attack performance. Denoting M = {m} as the
predefined mask, MMD is computed by 1|M |
∑
m∈M y ·m,
which is the mean depth value in the masked area (served
as the attack targets in the image). It represents the average
Algorithm 1 Multi-Task Universal Perturbation Generation
Require: Training samples X, perturbation bound , learn-
ing rate γ, momentum µ, epoch number Nep and iteration
number T
Require: Loss function of the two tasks Ldepth and Lsemantic
and weights of the two tasks wdepth and wsemantic.
1: Randomly initialize δ
2: for epoch = 1 . . .Nep do
3: for miniatch B ⊂ X do
4: Initialize B0 = B, g0 = 0
5: for iteration t = 0 . . .T− 1 do
6: Compute single task loss L
depth
t and L
semantic
t
7: Compute single task gradient ∇xLdeptht and
∇xLsemantict
8: Compute average loss according to Eq. 9
9: Compute average gradient according to Eq. 10
10: Update gradient gt+1 = µ · gt + gt
11: Compute xt+1 by Eq. 7 and update minibatch
Bt+1 = {xt+1}
12: end for
13: Compute perturbation δB = ExT∈BT(xT − x0)
14: Update universal perturbation δ ← δ + γ · δB
15: end for
16: end for
17: return Universal perturbation δ
distance of objects to the camera. Note that the predefined
C in Eq. 2 is set to 100 meters in our experiments, thus the
larger MMD is, the better performance the attack method
shows (i.e. the results are closer to C = 100). The predefined
masks is the masks of target objects. How these objects are
selected will be explained in the following paragraph.
Target Objects. We select cars, people, and riders with
small depth values as the attack target. Firstly, we use Mask-
RCNN[59] to predict the instance segmentation for each
image and select the instance mask of cars, people and riders.
Then we use the sparse depth ground truth of KITTI dataset
to estimate the average depth of each instance. Finally, we
select instances whose average depth is smaller than 50m.
Baseline models. We follow the encoder-decoder frame-
work in [9] to set up the models in our experiments. Four
different backbones are used as the encoding part, including
ResNet-18 [60], VGG-16 [61], ResNet-50 and ResNet-101.
For the decoding parts, they are composed of 4 UpConv
layers followed by a bilinear upsampling layer in all models
[58]. Note that we refer each model by the backbone archi-
tecture. The total training epoch is 20 for all models and we
show the baseline performance in Table II.
Semantic segmentation model used in multi-task at-
tack. We utilize the state-of-the-art semantic segmentation
model, PSPNet [62], to provide additional supervision sig-
nals. We use Cityscapes [63] to train the network. The total
epoch is 100 and random crop (321×929 in our experiment
to suit the image size in KITTI) is used during training. When
optimizing the universal attack with multi-task strategy, two
Metric RMSE ↑ (non-targeted attack) MMD ↑ (targeted attack)
Method ResNet-18 VGG-16 ResNet-50 ResNet-101 ResNet-18 VGG-16 ResNet-50 ResNet-101
ResNet-18
FGSM 11.54 (2.7×) 10.30 (2.4×) 11.02 (2.7×) 10.18 (2.2×) 23.51 (1.1×) 18.45 (0.9×) 19.34 (0.9×) 19.66 (0.9×)
I-FGSM 35.05 (8.3×) 10.30 (2.4×) 16.02 (3.9×) 7.95 (1.7×) 72.33 (3.5×) 26.95 (1.3×) 34.42 (1.7×) 25.46 (1.2×)
MI-FGSM 32.37 (7.7×) 11.60 (2.6×) 16.70 (4.0×) 9.63 (2.0×) 72.35 (3.5×) 27.38 (1.3×) 35.54 (1.7×) 25.57 (1.2×)
VGG-16
FGSM 8.69 (2.1×) 11.5 (2.6×) 9.45 (2.3×) 9.30 (2.0×) 22.90 (1.1×) 24.63 (1.2×) 22.98 (1.1×) 19.77 (0.9×)
I-FGSM 7.13 (1.7×) 37.40 (8.5×) 10.48 (2.5×) 6.34 (1.3×) 23.39 (1.1×) 74.82 (3.6×) 25.73 (1.2×) 23.09 (1.1×)
MI-FGSM 9.00 (2.1×) 36.23 8.2×) 12.52 (3.0×) 8.26 (1.8×) 24.08 (1.1×) 76.47 (3.7×) 27.07 (1.3×) 22.76 (1.1×)
ResNet-50
FGSM 10.27 (2.4×) 9.98 (2.3×) 11.58 (2.8×) 9.59 (2.0×) 20.48 (1.0×) 19.77 (1.0×) 25.27 (1.2×) 20.42 (1.0×)
I-FGSM 8.26 (1.9×) 8.22 (1.9×) 42.27 (10.1×) 6.42 (1.4×) 24.77 (1.2×) 24.58 (1.2×) 78.72 (3.8×) 23.92 (1.1×)
MI-FGSM 10.51 (2.5×) 10.40 (2.3×) 38.37 (9.2×) 8.54 (1.8×) 25.34 (1.2×) 25.21 (1.2×) 79.78 (3.8×) 23.96 (1.1×)
ResNet-101
FGSM 9.26 (2.2×) 8.69 (2.0×) 10.22 (2.4×) 12.54 (2.7×) 23.88 (1.1×) 20.45 (1.0×) 23.61 (1.1×) 31.14 (1.5×)
I-FGSM 7.39 (1.8×) 7.13 (1.6×) 9.49 (2.3×) 25.25 (5.4×) 23.87 (1.1×) 23.59 (1.1×) 26.16 (1.3×) 56.35 (2.6×)
MI-FGSM 9.08 (2.2×) 9.00 (2.0×) 11.66 (2.8×) 24.52 (5.2×) 24.34 (1.2×) 23.65 (1.1×) 26.89 (1.3×) 56.65 (2.7×)
TABLE I: The overall evaluation (RMSE represents the average depth estimation error for the whole image, while MMD
indicates the mean estimated depth value of the masked target) results for adversarial attacks in white-box (shaded cells)
and black-box (others) settings. The number in the parentheses are relative to the baseline results in Table II. A higher value
indicates better attack effect.
Model ResNet18 VGG16 ResNet50 ResNet101
RMSE(m) 4.22 4.42 4.17 4.70
MMD(m) 20.76 20.57 20.82 21.34
TABLE II: Baseline performance of different models.
different networks are used for the depth estimation and
semantic segmentation.
Universal multi-task attack setting. To implement uni-
versal multi-task attack, root mean squared error(RMSE) loss
is selected as Ldepth in Equ. 9 and Lsemantic is the widely used
softmax loss [62].
Attack settings. We use L2 distance as the loss function
L. If not specified intentionally, we set the perturbation
constraint  = 16. For iterative attack methods, we set
iteration number to min(+4, 1.25) following [16] and step
size α = 1. For MI-FGSM, we set µ = 1 as [22] suggests.
B. Single Model Attack
In this experiment, we follow [22] to report the white-box
and black-box attacks in the single-model setting, where all
four networks attack each other in both non-targeted and
targeted attacks. Table I reports the overall results, where
models in each row generate adversarial perturbations that
are evaluated on models in each column.
For non-targeted attacks, we are showing the mean error
(RMSE) values to indicate the extent of distortion by these
attacks. We can see that for white-box attacks, the estimation
errors are up to 10× of the original error in the baseline
models (Table II). The black-box attacks are not so effective,
but still achieve an average error of up to 4× compared to
the baselines.
For targeted attacks, we show the average distance in the
estimation results in Table I. We can see that the estimated
distance is up to 4× (from around 20m to 80m) farther than
the original prediction (Table II). As an illustrative example,
Fig. 1 presents a case to attack a car nearby. This adversary
phenomenon would be really dangerous if a pedestrian or car
is estimated to be 68 meters away when it is actually only
8 meters away, in scenarios such as automonous driving.
In addition, Table I also demonstrates the robustness of
different backbones. As shown in the shadow cells, ResNet-
50 is the most fragile one in both non-targeted and targeted
attacks. Considering its high performance on clean images,
this observation is consistent with the previous claim [64]
that models with higher performance are more vulnerable.
C. Move Objects to an Arbitrary Distance
This section shows that the depth value of an object
can be manipulated to any number, i.e. move any ob-
ject to an arbitrary distance. Fig. 2 displays a sample
attack result. The example image is 2011_09_26/0036/im-
age_02/0000000050.png of the KITTI depth dataset. The
attack target is the black car on the right side of the image
(red box in Fig 2(a)) and the original average depth of the
target vehicle is 11.4m. After attack, the average depth of
the target object can achieve a minimum of 4.4m and a
maximum of 80.8m. This means the attacker can not only
pull the target closer (Fig. 2(b), from 11.4m to 4.4m), but
also push it further to nearly arbitrary distance (Fig. 2(d) to
Fig. 2(g), from 11.4m to a maximum of 80.8m).
Note that this attack is concealed very well. On the one
hand, the operation on the RGB image is very subtle (the
left column of Fig. 2). On the other hand, the depth of other
parts of the image is barely changed. In Fig. 2, the depth
detail of the pole is preserved well (orange boxes in Fig 2) .
Model Method ResNet-18 VGG-16 ResNet-50
Single-task
FGSM 5.967 6.784 6.18
I-FGSM 6.108 6.877 6.464
MI-FGSM 7.173 7.503 7.257
Multi-task
FGSM 6.693 8.098 8.197
I-FGSM 5.566 6.021 5.863
MI-FGSM 9.378 8.582 9.757
TABLE III: The average depth errors (RMSE) of universal
adversarial attacks with respect to different attack meth-
ods and settings. Single-task represents utilizing only non-
targeted depth information and multi-task means adopting
information of both depth and segmentation.
(a) Original Image , Mean Object Depth=11.4m
(b) Adversarial Example, Mean Object Depth=4.4m
(c) Adversarial Example, Mean Object Depth=20.2m
(d) Adversarial Example, Mean Object Depth=31.0m
(e) Adversarial Example, Mean Object Depth=44.7m
(f) Adversarial Example, Mean Object Depth=54.8m
(g) Adversarial Example, Mean Object Depth=68.5m
(h) Adversarial Example, Mean Object Depth=80.8m
Fig. 2: Visualization of targeted attack on
2011_09_26/0036/image_02/0000000050.png of KITTI
depth dataset to change the depth result of the target
object (the black car in the red boxes) to arbitrary value
without changing other part. Besides, the modification to
the rgb image is subtle and the depth detail of other parts
is preserved well (the pole in orange boxes)
D. Universal Attack
In this experiment, we perform the universal adversarial
attack in both multi-task and single-task settings. We set
wdepth = 0.5, wsemantic = 0.5 for multi-task setting and
wdepth = 1, wsemantic = 0 for single-task in Eq. 10. Table III
reports the white-box attack result, where single-task denotes
to only use depth information and multi-task represents to
leverage multiple supervision signals. As shown in Table III,
with the help of the multi-task strategy, the results of
FGSM and MI-FGSM are improved significantly compared
to single-task. This demonstrates that more comprehensive
(a) Image
(b) Image + UAP
(c) Depth Prediction
(d) Adversarial Depth Prediction
(e) Semantic Segmentation
(f) Adversarial Semantic Segmentation
Fig. 3: Visualization of the effect of the universal perturba-
tion. The left and right represents two different images.
supervision signals do benefit the universal adversarial per-
turbation generation. The reason may be that the high-level
information of semantic segmentation enriches supervision
signal of low-level depth information, thus reinforces attack
effect on universal adversarial perturbation. Fig. 3 displays
an example of the universal attack, where the results of both
depth estimation and semantic segmentation are distorted
dramatically.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present to the best of our knowledge
the first systematic investigation of adversarial attacks on
monocular depth estimation. We propose three types of
attack, i.e. non-targeted attacks, targeted attacks and universal
attacks and adapt three state-of-the-art methods to perform
these attacks. Muti-task setting enriches supervision signals
by adopting high-level information for universal attacks.
Extensive experiments demonstrate the vulnerability of depth
estimation models and the effectiveness of multi-task strategy
compared to different methods. In particular, we demonstrate
the targeted attack on certain objects is able to twist depth
estimation up to an average of 4× from the ground truth.
Our work reveals the severe impact of adversarial attacks on
depth estimation, as these attacks may result in grave security
concerns if applied in cases such as autonomous driving.
We hope this work can provide a baseline and guidance for
adversarial attacks research on monocular depth estimation.
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